

Tariff Design Primer

DRAFT

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Final Comprehensive Market Design Cost Review



How capacity market costs are generated

- Capacity Auctions: all capacity costs are a result of capacity purchased from capacity assets
 - Base auction: three years prior to deliver
 - Rebalancing auctions: 18 months and 3 months prior to delivery
- How much capacity is bought
 - The AESO will determine a capacity value for all assets

Steps to mitigate costs

- Rebalancing auctions
 - Allows AESO to reduce capacity purchases through sales of capacity if the expected need of capacity is reduced over time
- Performance assessments offsets
 - When capacity is not available or delivered as expected, the AESO will receive a capacity payment “refund”
 - The “refund” is paid to the AESO after over performers have received bonus payments
- Market power mitigation
 - There is a must offer requirement for all generation assets
 - Firms that have the ability to influence price higher to the benefit of their capacity portfolio will be subject to offer restrictions

Capacity Market Procurement Overview

Background - Government Resource Adequacy Standard

- Government policy direction sets out a minimum level of resource adequacy (maximum level of expected unserved energy)
 - Maximum of 0.0011% of energy unserved
 - roughly equivalent to current LTA rule (202.6)
 - Minimum \neq Target




Resource Adequacy Standard

- Alberta will use a Normalized Expected Unserved Energy Metric
- The standard will be set where a maximum of 0.0011 per cent of the energy goes unserved
 - This maintains the level of reliability experienced by Alberta since 2006
 - The majority of stakeholders who provided input to government supported this standard

Resource Adequacy Model – What it does


- The Resource Adequacy Model (RAM) determines the tradeoff between capacity (MW) and reliability (MWh) using a probabilistic approach that varies load and generation
- The RAM will be used to determine how much capacity is required to meet the government's Resource Adequacy Standard

Expected Unserved
Energy (MWh)





- Construction of scenarios, after a resource mix is defined
SERVM runs 7,500 different 8,760 hour simulations
 - 30 weather years (load and renewable profiles)
 - Load forecast economic growth uncertainty (distribution of 5 points)
 - Unit outage modeling, capturing frequency and duration (50 iterations)

SERVM Framework for Creating Different Scenarios



Demand Curve Overview






- The AESO can assess output from the RAM to determine which hours, days, months, etc. have the most/least EUE to help inform cost allocation blocks

Questions?

Tariff Design Introduction

Tariff design model



- Cost causation based tariff design
 - Relies on identifying what is causing the cost
 - Then price signal targets consumption behavior that cause cost
 - Important to align all price signals for all costs recovered by the tariff (transmission and, in future, capacity market) to support efficient consumption
- Then resulting change in behavior defers or lowers or eliminates future cost

Tariff Design Components

- Functionalization
- Classification
- Allocation
- Rate design
- Billing determinants
- Bill impact mitigation
- Deferral accounts

- Functionalization: grouping costs together based on what caused them.
 - Transmission
 - Transmission system comprises of thousands of elements
 - To simplify the task of determining what caused these thousands of elements, or will cause similar elements in the future, these elements are grouped together based on the “function” they serve
 - After removing radial point of delivery or supply elements, can rest of transmission elements be grouped together into function? If so how?
 - Capacity market – Can costs be functionalized? If so how?

- Classification: dividing functionalized costs between consumer demand and energy consumption.
- Within each function, cost can be caused by different aspect of consumption, such as:
 - Peak demand
 - Co-incident peak demand
 - Contract demand
 - Energy
 - Number of customers
 - Per day, etc.
- For a given function, classification determines which aspect of consumption is causing what proportion of the cost.

Classification (cont'd)

- Which **transmission** function(s) should be classified? If so how?
- Which **capacity** market function(s) should be classified? If so how?

- Customers can be grouped together into few clearly distinct rate classes based on their hourly usage profile over the year(s)
- Each rate class would then have a different cost causation profile
- Allocation is the exercise of dividing functionalized and classified costs between rate classes
- Findings from functionalization and classification exercises inform the allocation exercise

- Billing determinants are the result of a calculation that produces a customer's consumption/demand for a defined period of time
- Common Billing Determinants
 - Coincident peak – peak demand by a group during a defined period of time
 - Total energy – total consumption during a defined period of time
 - Highest metered demand – peak demand by a single customer during a defined period of time
 - Contract demand – contract level
 - Weighted energy – total consumption by multiple defined periods of time


- After cost has been functionalized, classified and allocated to a rate class, a rate must be designed to recover this cost from this rate class
- Functionalization, classification, allocation and rate class behavioral and economic profile information is utilized to create a rate
 - Price signal that is expected to be most effective in meeting the goal
- For capacity market costs, rate design would have to be based on weighted energy
 - I.e. time of use (super-peak, on-peak, off-peak)

- Rates should be stable and predictable to allow consumers to plan and respond efficiently
- For load only consumers, total electric energy bill increase of 10% or more is considered excessive (i.e., rate shock)
- If change in tariff design causes rate shock then mitigation plan maybe required
- In past the Commission has directed the AESO to subsidize such affected consumers by collecting the shortfall from all consumers
- Not applicable to capacity market bills at this time

- If change in tariff design causes rate shock:
 - Transmission system and transmission costs would not change but bills can change significantly
 - Which bill impact should be mitigated?
 - What should be the term of any mitigation?
 - Does tariff design remain valid with any such mitigation?

- If tariff design changes significantly:
 - Should market participants be provided a notice if tariff design is changing significantly?
 - What is an appropriate notice period?
 - How would such advance notice change market participant behavior?
 - Does tariff design remain valid with any such change in behavior?

Tariff design exercise



- Tariff design is a forward looking exercise using forecast cost, forecast consumption and behavior and other such information
- Difference between actuals and forecast is dealt with in deferral accounts
- Transmission tariff uses tariff application, tariff update, quarterly correction, and after the fact annual correction model
- What is an appropriate model for the capacity market tariff?

Sample Designs - Transmission

Assumes total annual revenue requirement of about \$2 billion

Billing Determinant	Value	Rate
Co-incident peak	97,698 MW	\$20,650/MW
Total energy	61,303 GWh	\$33/MWh
Highest metered demand (no ratchet)	122,370 MW	\$16,486/MW
Billing capacity demand (90% two year ratchet)	156,984 MW	\$12,851/MW
Weighted Energy (Weightings of 1:2:3) - Super (4pm-8pm) - On Peak - Off-peak (10pm-8am)	10,905 GWh 26,773 GWh 23,624 GWh	\$55/MWh \$37/MWh \$18/MWh

Sample Designs – Capacity Market

Assumes total annual revenue requirement of \$1 billion

Billing Determinant	Value	Rate
Weighted Energy (Weightings of 1:2:3) - Super-peak (4pm-8pm) - On-peak - Off-peak (10pm-8am)	10,905 GWh 26,773 GWh 23,624 GWh	\$27/MWh \$18/MWh \$9/MWh
Weighted Energy (Weightings of 0:1:4) - three blocks as above	10,905 GWh 26,773 GWh 23,624 GWh	\$57/MWh \$14/MWh \$0/MWh
Weighted Energy (Weightings of 1:4) - On-peak (4pm-8pm) - Off-peak	10,905 GWh 50,398 GWh	\$43/MWh \$11/MWh

- Some recent large transmission projects have been caused by generation and by government mandate:
 - Consumers did not directly cause these projects and any of their response would not have deferred or eliminated these projects
- Consumers have responded to prior and current tariff by investing in on-site generation and modifying consumption patterns

Key Observations (cont'd)

- Costs have risen by multiples within last 20 years and are expected level out
- Generation capacity market, small scale renewable generation and community generation may further incent on-site generation
- Consumers are demanding service with different levels of quality (interruptible, non-firm etc.)

How should we proceed?

- What questions do we have?
- What do we want to know?
- What work does this lead to?
 - Historical data
 - Economic data
 - Forecast data
- Balancing scope, resourcing and timeline

Thank you